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i)

A.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Stream Access Coalition (the "Coalition") agrees with Orange
Street's jurisdictional statement.

B.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue 1: Does the Coalition have standing, under its federal navigability
for title claim, to seek a declaration that the State of Utah holds sovereign
~

land title to the bed of the Weber River where it crosses the landowners'
properties?
Standard of Review: The Coalition agrees that standing is
generally a question of law, reviewed by this court for correctness.
Preservation: No party raised the issue of the Coalition's

@

standing below. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that, under
appropriate circumstances, can be raised for the first time on appeal.
However, such circumstances do not exist here.
Issue 2: Did the district court apply the correct test of navigability to
the question of whether the Coalition's members may use the Weber River for
recreational activity where it crosses the landowners' properties?
Standard of Review: The Coalition agrees that the standard of
review is manifest injustice or plain error.
Preservation: The Coalition agrees that this issue is not
preserved.
1
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Issue 3: Did the district court err as a matter of law when it concluded
under the federal navigability for title test that the Weber River is navigable
where it crosses the landowners' properties based on evidence of
commercially successful statehood-era log drives?
Standard of Review: The Coalition agrees that this issue presents
a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Preservation: The Coalition agrees that this issue is preserved.
Issue 4: Did the district court err as a matter of law when it concluded
under the federal navigability for title test that the Weber River is navigable
where it crosses the landowners' properties based on statehood-era log drives
that regularly occurred during annual periods of spring runoff?
Standard of Review: The Coalition agrees that this issue presents a
question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Preservation: The Coalition agrees that this issue is preserved.

C.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

The dete.rminative law in this case is federal navigability law as
expressed in federal and state court opinions. Utah's Public Waters Access
Act is not determinative; it merely confirms the public's right to use waters
that meet the federal navigability test.

2
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D.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
The Coalition generally agrees with Orange Street's statement, except

•

the Coalition does not seek use of the streambed pursuant to a separate test
of navigability in Utah's Public Waters Access Act. The Coalition's claim is
based on the navigability of the Weber River at statehood under federal law.

2.

Statement of the Facts
Orange Street's statement of the facts is accurate as far as it goes. But

there are many additional facts important to the consideration of the issues
in this case. The navigability of the Weber River involves a fascinating and
little-known history that deserves to be told in full.
2.1.

Background to the dispute and facts relating to standing

This court's ruling in Conatser v. Johnson recognized a public easement
right to use public waters in place for any lawful purpose, including
•

recreation, and to touch the streambed in ways incidental to that use,
irrespective of bed own~rship. 2008 UT 48

_,rso, 194 P.3d 897 .. Under

Conatser, boaters and anglers had a right to walk on, wade in, and otherwise
use streambeds while boating and fishing, even where the streams passed
through private lands. Id. The Coalition's members frequently exercised this
right while wade fishing the stretch of the Weber River that passes through
the properties of Orange Street and the other landowner defendants near

3
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Peoa, Utah (the "Properties.") (R.87 4, 613-616, 97 4:42-44; Ex. 1, attached as
Add. A.)
In 2010, the Utah Legislature passed the so-called Public Waters
Access Act (the "Act") restricting the public's right use public waters that
traverse private streambeds. Utah Code §73-29-101 et seq. Under the Act,
the public is limited to a right to float such waters if they are floatable, and to
make contact with the streambed only as necessary for "safe passage and
continued movement." Id. at §202. The Act eliminates all other rights to use
streambeds of waters passing through private lands. Id. at §201(3).
The Act exempts "navigable" waters, and waters "on public property."

Id. at §201(1)(a). While the scope of the Act's definition of "navigable" waters
is not entirely clear, it at least includes waters navigable under the federal
title test. See infra at 33-34. Regardless, the bed of a stream navigable under
the federal test is public property, thereby satisfying the Act's public
property exception. Id.; see also §206(1).
After the Act took effect, Orange Street and other landowner
defendants posted no trespassing signs at a public access point on the Weber
River adjacent to the Properties. (R.874, 613-616, 974:42-44_) The signs
specifically forbade the public's use of the Weber's streambed for any purpose.

Id. The State of Utah, through its Division of Wildlife Resources, declared
that anglers were required to get landowner permission to use the
4
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•

streambeds of non-navigable waters passing through private lands. See
https://web.archive.org/web/2014040920353 7/http://wildlife.utah.gov/fishingin-utah/238-hb-14 l.html. The State's online Sovereign Lands map showed
(and still shows) the Weber as a non-navigable stream. See
http://www.ffsl.utah.gov/index.php/state-lands/maps. 1 State law enforcement
officials have issued citations to anglers and other river users for trespass on
(i)

the streambed as a result of landowner complaints. (R974:29.)
Not willing to risk trespass citations and conflicts with landowners, the
Coalition's members ceased using the Weber River at the Properties. (R.874,
613-616, 974:42-44.) Instead, the Coalition brought this action to determine
the Weber's navigability under federal law in order to re-establish its
members' right to use the streambed. Id. The Coalition's members desire to
resume their use of the streambed of the Weber for fishing and other lawful
recreational purposes, and will do so if allowed by a ruling of this court.
(R.874, 613-616.)
2.2.

Facts relating to navigability·

The following facts are embodied in the district court's findings of fact
and are based on: 1) historical evidence presented by Dr. Sara Dant,
1

8

•

The Coalition asks the court to take judicial notice of the foregoing
government website references, and the Judgment in the Simantel case, infra
at 29, even though they are not part of the record in this case. They are part
of the public record and the Coalition would have offered them below had it
known that its standing would be challenged.

5
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Professor of Western American History at Weber State University; 2)
evidence related to the hydraulic and other physical characteristics of the
Weber and other rivers in the region presented by Gary Nichols, a river
running expert, and 3) hydrological evidence presented by Candice
Hasenyager, a hydrologist with the Utah Division of Water Resources. To
help the district court interpret the facts in historical context, and in the
context of the issues presented in this case, Dr. Dant offered opinions on the
history of statehood era commercial uses of the Weber River and other rivers
in the region, which opinions the district court found persuasive. (R.879.) Mr.
Nichols offered opinions, which the district court found persuasive, on the
present-day conditions and characteristics of the Upper Weber and the flows
at which it is capable of floating small recreational boats and cut logs 8-10 ft.
long during normal spring flows. (R.877.)

2.2.1. Physical characteristics of the Weber River
The Weber River originates in the western Uinta Mountains and flows
for approximately 125 miles through Summit, Morgan and Weber Counties to
its mouth at the Great Salt Lake. (R.874-75.) See Add. A. Like many
mountain rivers in the West, the bulk of the Weber's flow comes in the spring
runoff season, typically during the months of May and June. (R.876.) The
Weber's mean monthly flow jumps from around 100 cubic feet per second
("cfs") during the late summer, fall and winter, to around 800 cfs during the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 6
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

spring. 2 (R.876; Ex. 101, 128.) These spring flows are fed by melting
snowpack in the Uinta Mountains, and are one of the defining characteristics
of rivers in the West. (R.977:137-43,182-83; Ex. 12:264-66.)
Today, the overall character of the Upper Weber, a stretch from
Holiday Park3 to Echo, Utah that includes the Properties, see Add. A, is fast
and continuous water with small Class 1-3 rapids. (R.877-78.) While there is
~

some braiding, there are no waterfalls, impassable gorges or other similar
natural obstacles to navigation, and this stretch of the Weber can easily float
small recreational boats or cut logs 8-10 ft. long during normal spring flows.
(R.877-78.)
The only differences between statehood-era and present-day conditions
consists of dams, reservoirs and diversions, mostly constructed since the
1930s, that diminish present-day flows of the Upper Weber below Oakley,
Utah. (R.877.) Accordingly, conditions at statehood on the stretch below
Oakley, which includes the Properties, were more favorable than present-day
conditions for the cominercial uses at issue in this case. (R.877.)

2

~

•

Mean monthly flow is the average flow of the river for the entire month.

3

Holiday Park is at the headwaters of the Weber River, where three forks
come together to form the main stem. Today, it is a private cabin area at the
end of the Upper Weber Canyon Road.
7
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2.2.2. Early log floats on the Weber River
In 1852, Robert Gardner, a prominent early pioneer sawmill operator
who was likely acting on behalf of the LDS Church, surveyed the Weber River
for "timber and floating purposes" from the mouth of Lower Weber Canyon
Gust above Ogden) to the headwaters, including the section passing through
the Properties. (R.879, 97 4:71, Ex. 2.) He found the River generally to be
good for log floating. (R.879, Ex. 2.) In the 1850s and 1860s logs were floated
down the Lower Weber to sawmills at Morgan and Uintah, Utah. (R.879)
The historical record does not indicate how far up the River these log floats
started, or whether they passed through the Properties. (R.879.)

2.2.3. Railroad tie drives on the Upper Weber
In 1868, the Transcontinental Railroad brought the railroad tie
industry to the Central Rockies and the Intermountain West. (R.879.)
Millions of railroad ties were needed to build and maintain the
Transcontinental Railroad and other lines to follow. (R.879; Ex. 12:62) These

t>

railroad ties were obtained from. forests in the surrounding mountains..
(R.879.) During the fall and winter, men called "tie hacks" went into the
forests to cut and hew the railroad ties. (R.879.) Finished ties were hauled by
sled to the nearest river that ran to the railroad line. (R.879-80.) During
spring runoff, the ties were released into the river and driven downstream to
the rail crossing, where they were collected in a boom, removed from the

8
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•

river, and shipped by rail to their ultimate destination. (R.880, 97 4: 117;
Ex.12:281.) Hundreds of thousands of railroad ties could be transported in a
single drive over distances exceeding one hundred miles. (Ex.12:270-73.)
Hundreds of men were employed in the larger drives. (Ex.12:270-73.)
On most rivers, these "tie drives" used the spring runoff; normal flows
at other times of the year were insufficient. (R.880; Ex. 12:266.) Loggers
•

knew that they could depend on the high water that comes every spring with
the melting of the snowpack. (R.880, 891, 974:105-113, 120, 229; Ex. 12=26466.) Despite dangers and hardships, tie drives were a critical component of

@

the railroad and railroad tie industries. (R.879-80, 974:114-15.) Indeed the
river drives were the only feasible way to rapidly obtain large quantities of
timber from remote mountain forests that lacked roads and other
transportation infrastructure. (R.882-83, 97 4:220-23.) During the late 1800s
and early 1900s, this practice was used successfully around the West year
after year on river after river to transport enormous quantities of timber
products from high mountain forests to railheads and markets in the valleys.
(R.879, 891, 974:105-113, 120, 229; Ex. 12:264-66.)
Tie drives first occurred in northeastern Utah in 1868 on the Bear and
Blacks Fork Rivers. (R.880.) See Add. A. In 1869, the Union Pacific extended
i)

the Transcontinental Railroad to Echo, Utah, and established a connection
between the railroad and the Upper Weber River. (R.880.) The first

•
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documented tie drive on the Upper Weber occurred in the spring of 1877.
(R.880.) This drive started near Holiday Park and ran downstream to the
rail line at Echo. (R.880.) Along the way, it passed through the Properties.
(R.880.) A news report from Peoa stated that "large numbers" of ties were
transported during this drive. (R.881.)
This drive was conducted by a primary provider of railroad ties to the
Union Pacific Railroad. (R.880.) A tie hack named George Carter drowned
during the drive a short distance above the Weber's confluence with Smith
and Morehouse Creek. (R.880.) His grave can be found today on a bluff
overlooking the river where he died. (R.974=86; Ex.10.)
Another tie drive occurred in 1879, starting in Upper Weber Canyon
and passing through the Properties. (R.881.) At least one and probably two
documented drives occurred in the spring of 1880 to supply ties for two
competing rail lines under construction from Echo to Park City- the Union
Pacific's Summit County Railway, and the locally owned Utah Eastern
Railway. (R~881.) Each line required at least 60,000 railroad ties. (R.881.)
These drives ran from Holiday Park to Echo, passing through the Properties.
(R.881.)
After the completion of the two rail lines to Park City, a boom was
constructed at Wanship, which had become the upper-most rail crossing on
the river. (R.881.) In 1881, "a Peoa man" drove at least 42,000 ties from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law10
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Upper Weber Canyon to the boom at Wanship, passing through the

•

Properties. (R.881.) This drive supplied ties to the Union Pacific Railroad,
probably for the Oregon Short Line, a major regional line then under
construction. (R.881.)
In the spring of 1882, there was another drive down the Upper Weber
to Wanship, passing through the Properties, to supply ties for the Union

GI

Pacific and the Oregon Short Line. (R.882.) During the previous winter, the
Union Pacific had run newspaper ads seeking 100 woodchoppers to cut ties
on the Weber River and its branches, suggesting that the 1882 drive must
have contained a very large number of railroad ties. (R.882.) The Union
Pacific ran a similar ad the following winter indicating that another drive
likely occurred in the spring of 1883. (R.882.)
In the spring of 1896, just after statehood, the Salt Lake Tribune
reported that the Salt Lake & Pacific Railroad was "getting out a large
number [of railroad ties] in Weber canyon," indicating a likelihood that the
Salt Lake & Pacific ties were driven down the Upper Weber past the
Properties to Wanship. (R.882-83.)

It is likely that other tie drives occurred on the Upper Weber during
the 1870s, 80s and 90s that would have passed through the Properties,
although exact dates and circumstances are not specifically documented in
the historical record. (R.883.) For example, a regional forester recalled that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law11
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in the 1880s ties were driven from Beaver Creek (which enters the Weber
above the Properties) to Wanship five or six times. (R.883.)
2.2.4. Mining timber and cordwood drives on the Upper Weber

In the 1880s, the mining boom in Park City led to a demand for mining
timbers and cordwood. (R.885.) After the success of the Upper Weber tie
drives, news accounts predicted that the Park City mines would draw upon
the "vast the forests at the head of the Weber River" for their supply of
mining timbers and cordwood "for years to come," and that these products
would be floated down the Weber River to the boom at Wanship and then
shipped by rail to Park City. (R.885.)
The first documented drive of mining timbers and cordwood started in
the summer of 1888. (R.885.) 1000 railroad cars worth of mining timbers had
been cut at the headwaters of the Weber for the Ontario and Daly mines.
(R.885.) The drive got hung up that summer in Peoa due to low water.
(R.885.)
During the following spring (1889), the logs from the 1888 drive were
driven on to Wanship. (R.885-86.) These logs passed through the Properties
either in 1888 or 1889, depending on where in Peoa they were hung up.
(R.885-86.)
Normal water conditions returned in 1890, and a second drive of
mining timbers and cordwood to Wanship occurred that spring, passing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law12
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•

through the Properties. (R.886.) The wood from the 1888-89 and 1890 drives

•

supplied the mines in Park City for at least two years. (R.886.)

It is likely that other drives of mining timber and cordwood occurred on
the Upper Weber that would have passed through the Properties during the
1880s and 90s, although exact dates and circumstances of the drives are not
specifically documented in the historical record. (R.886-87.) The likelihood of
€1>

these additional drives is demonstrated by news accounts in 1892, 1893 and
1894 which continued to refer to large quantities of mining timber coming to
Park City from mills on the Weber River above Wanship, and family histories
from families living along the Weber in Wanship report "regular drives" or
drives "each year" of mining timbers and cordwood during this period.
(R.887.)

2.2.5. Log drives to saw mills on the Upper Weber
In the 1880s and 1890s, logs were floated down the Weber River from
the Upper Weber Canyon to various sawmills located along the river to be
processed into lumber. (R.887.) At least one mill to which these "saw logs"

•

were floated was located north (downstream) of Wanship, meaning that logs
floated to this mill would have passed through the Properties. (R.887.) In
addition there were several saw mills located at Peoa in the early 1890s,
although the historical record does not reveal whether these mills were
located above or below the Properties. (R.887.) At these mills, logs were
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milled into lumber, shingles and other products that were then hauled
overland to Park City. (R.887.) The road from Peoa to Park City during the
early 1890s followed the route of today's Browns Canyon Road and crossed
the River at the location of the Properties, making them an ideal location for
one or more of the Peoa saw mills. (R.888.) Any saw logs floated to the
Browns Canyon Road would have passed through some of the Properties,
and, at the very least, demonstrated the susceptibility of the Upper Weber to
float saw logs where it passes through all of the Properties. (R.888.)

2.2.6. Drives on nearby rivers
From the late 1860s until the 1930s railroad tie drives were a common
practice on rivers in northeastern Utah, and across the Intermountain West
and the Central Rocky Mountain Region. (R.884.) In addition to the drives
on the Weber, numerous tie drives occurred on the Provo River from the late
1870s to the early to mid-1890s, on the Upper Bear River (from its
headwaters in Utah to Evanston, Wyoming) and the Blacks Fork River (from
its headwaters in Utah to Granger, Wyoming) from 1868 until the 1930s.
(R.884.) See Add. A. For instance, tie drives have been documented on the
Provo River in 1879, 1881, 1882, 1888, 1890, 1891, 1893, and 1894. (R.884.)
As with the Upper Weber, the tie drives on these rivers were performed
during spring runoff conditions. (R.884.) Like the Weber, these rivers
originate in the western Uinta Mountains and are similar in size and flow to
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the Upper Weber, and have similar characteristics in terms of seasonal
runoff, bed composition, braiding, gradients, Class 1-3 rapids and no
permanent obstacles to navigation by small recreational boats or cut logs
during normal spring flows. (R.884.)
(i)

2.3.

The district court's findings regarding navigability-in-fact

Based on the above facts, the district court found that Upper Weber
(i)

River, including the stretch that passed through the Properties, was used as
a highway of commerce in transporting railroad ties for local and regional
railroad lines from the late 1870s to 1896, in transporting mining timbers

•

and cordwood to the major mining center in Park City during the 1880s and
1890s, and in transporting saw logs to various sawmills located on the river
at Wanship and above during the same period. (R.888.)
The district court also found that the log and tie drives on the Upper
Weber were conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over
water, as evidenced by the widespread use of seasonal log and tie drives on
·other rivers in the region. (R.890.) The district court further found that the ·
drives occurred on the Upper Weber in its natural condition, there being no
evidence of measures to aid the drives that substantially altered the natural
character of the stream. (R.890.)
Relating to the issue of seasonality, the district court found that the log
and tie drives on the Upper Weber were usefully and dependably performed
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during ordinary spring runoff conditions, even though occasional droughts or
other factors may have interfered with the progress of the drives. (R.891.)
The district court further found that the drives represented useful commerce
and played a significant role in developing the railroad and mining industries
in northern Utah and the surrounding region, and were useful in providing
wage-paying employment for the men of Wanship, Peoa, Oakley and other
communities along the River, adding significant value to local economies.
(R.891.)
Apart from the difficulties associated with the drive(s) in 1888-89, the
district court found that the absence of reports of drives on the Upper Weber
during years other than those documented above was not due to unfavorable
river conditions, but rather factors such as depletion of timber supplies,
competition from other rivers, financial crises affecting the railroad industry
and lumber markets, lack of news sources in the area, and the increasing
lack of newsworthiness of river drives over time (R.889.) These factors,
coupled with the documented drives on the Provo, Upper Bear and Blacks
Fork during the statehood era, and the similarities between the Upper Weber
and these other rivers, led the district court to find that the Upper Weber was
susceptible of being used for log and tie drives under normal conditions
throughout the statehood era, including in 1896. (R.889-90.)
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Based on the foregoing, the district court found that the Upper Weber
was navigable in fact at statehood where it now passes through the
Properties; i.e., at the time of statehood it was used and susceptible of being
used, in its natural and ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce, over
which trade and travel were or may have been conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel over water. (R.891.)

E.

Sl.Jl\fMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court correctly addressed sovereign title to the bed of the
Weber River where it passes through the Properties because sovereign title is
an essential attribute of navigability and the Coalition has standing to bring
a navigability claim. The district court correctly applied the federal test of
8

navigability, and in doing so, properly determined that the Weber River is
navigable where it passes through the Properties. The district court rightly
rejected Orange Street's "trade and travel" and "temporary high water"
arguments and correctly concluded, as have other courts, that the federal
· navigability test can be satisfied by evidence of log drives regularly and
successfully conducted during seasonal periods of high water.

F.

ARGUMENT

•
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1.

The Coalition has standing to bring a navigability claim
At first glance, Orange Street's new standing argument 4 appears to be

limited to the narrow question of whether the Coalition can ask for a
declaratory judgment that the State holds sovereign title to the riverbed, and
does not otherwise question the Coalition's standing to seek a navigability
determination to establish its members' rights to use the riverbed. In other
words, if the district court had not mentioned state title and had simply ruled
that the Weber is navigable, there would be no issue of standing.
A closer examination of Orange Street's arguments reveals a more
ambitious and troubling purpose. Orange Street argues in section 2 of its
brief that the navigable waters provision in Utah's Public Waters Access Act
does not authorize public use of rivers that were used as highways of
commerce at statehood and in which the State holds title to the riverbeds.
Instead, Orange Street contends that the Act's definition of navigable waters
is limited to waters presently serving as highways of commerce. Orange

4

Contrary to the statement at p 3 of the Appellant's Brief, the State did not
raise the issue of the Coalition's standing below. Orange Street cites to a
summary of the State's closing argument (filed in lieu of a missing portion of
the transcript) in which counsel stated that "this is not a quiet title case" and
that "only the State and private landowner claimants have standing to quiet
title to the subject riverbed lands." (R.861.) As explained below, the
Coalition is not seeking to quiet title. Nothing in the State's argument, or in
the arguments or positions taken by any party below, questions the standing
of the Coalition to bring a navigability claim simply because it implicates the
State's title to the stream bed.
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Street recognizes that the Act also allows public use of waters "on public
property," but argues that "premising access on public ownership of property
does not establish a basis for members of the public to assert title on the
State's behalf." Appellant's Brief at 30. In Orange Street's view, even though
the State necessarily holds title to the bed of a river navigable at statehood,
citizens who have been denied access to that river could never bring a
~

navigability claim to satisfy the "waters on public lands" provision of the Act
because that would amount to asserting title on the State's behalf. In other
words, the public has a right to use a streambed if it is public property, but
the public lacks standing to claim that the streambed is public property.
Of course, this catch-22 goes away if Orange Street is wrong about the

•

meaning of navigable waters in the Act. Even Orange Street seems to
concede that the Coalition would have standing to bring a statehood-era
navigability claim if that would establish a right of use under the navigable
waters provision of the Act. Section F.2 of this brief will demonstrate that
· this provision of the Act does include waters that meet the traditional,
statehood-era navigability test. But because Orange Street disputes the
point, this section will show that the Coalition also has standing to seek a
declaration that the bed of the Weber is public property if that is what is

@}

necessary to establish its members' rights of use under the Act.
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No American court has ever held that citizens who have been denied
use of a waterway lack standing to seek a judicial determination of
navigability because navigability implicates state title to the streambed.
Such a position would be wrong for many different reasons. First, it ignores
the elements of the traditional and alternative tests of standing in Utah
courts, all of which are easily satisfied in this case. Second, Orange Street's
position ignores the nature of the public's interest in lands beneath navigable
waters. While title is held by the State, it is held in trust for the very people
who bring this case, for the very purposes they seek to vindicate. Allowing
the State and only the State to decide which rivers are navigable would
violate well settled public trust principles. Third, this action is the only
recourse available to the Coalition to vindicate its rights under current Utah
statutes. The Utah Legislature has closed every other door, leaving
navigability as the Coalition's only route to restore the access its members
once had to the Weber River. Fourth, the Coalition seeks only to enforce its
member·s' right of use; it does not seek a full adjudication of title. · Fifth, the
State is a party to this action and has fully participated in the navigability
determination, thus eliminating any theoretical concern that the action may
affect title in its absence. Finally, Orange Street itself asked the district
court to determine that the Weber is non-navigable, and that the State does
not have title to the bed, a determination that would have been binding on
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Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

the State as well as the Coalition, leaving no doubt that the present case is fit
for judicial resolution. Whether viewed under the traditional or the
alternative test of standing, there can be no doubt that the Coalition's
interests give it standing to bring this action.
Before delving into the rules of standing, it is helpful to reflect on the
nature of the public's interest in the beds of navigable waters. State title to
~

lands beneath navigable waters is "different in character" from other lands
held by the state; it is held "in trust for the people of the state, that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private
parties." Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State ofIllinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). In

i)

Utah, the State's trust duties are embodied in Art. XX, Sec 1, of the Utah
Constitution which states that such lands are "held in trust for the people ...
for the respective purposes for which they have been or may be granted,
donated, devised or otherwise acquired." The "essence of this doctrine is that
· navigable waters should .... be prese·rved for the general public for uses such
as commerce, navigation, and fishing." Colman v. Utah State Land Board,
795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990); see also National Parks and Conservation

Assii v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah 1993) (public trust
•

doctrine further protects the ecological integrity of public lands and their
public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large). In sum, even
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though the State holds legal title to lands beneath navigable waters, the true
owners are the people of Utah, and the purposes for which these lands were
granted are the purposes that the Coalition seeks to vindicate here-the
rights of fishing and navigation.
In addition to their constitutionally protected public trust rights in the
beds of navigable waters, the Coalition's members have a statutory right use
navigable waters for recreational purposes under Utah's Public Waters
Access Act. Although the purpose of that Act was to cut off the public's right
to use the beds of non-navigable waters traversing private lands, it does
provide that the public may use streambeds of "navigable" waters or waters
"on public property." Utah Code§ 73-29-201(1). While Orange Street is now
attempting to inject a dispute over the meaning of navigable waters under
the Act, it is beyond dispute that the Act allows the use of streambeds of
rivers meeting the federal navigability for title test because the State holds
title to such streambeds, making them waters on public property.

•

Under the traditional standing test in Utah courts, a party has
standing if 1) it has been adversely affected by the challenged actions, 2)
there is a causal relationship between the party's injury, the challenged
actions and the relief requested, and 3) the relief requested is likely to
redress the party's injury. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air

•

Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, if19,148 P.3d 960 (citations and internal quotation
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marks omitted). The purpose of this test is to determine whether the party
has suffered a "distinct and palpable injury" that gives it a "personal stake"
in the outcome of the litigation. Id.
The Coalition easily satisfies all three elements of the traditional
standing test. As more fully set forth supra at 3-5, before passage of the
Public Waters Access Act in 2010, the Coalition's members frequently
@

exercised their rights, recognized in Conatser v. Johnson, to walk upon and
wade in streambed of the Weber River while boating and fishing. 2008 UT 48.
After the Legislature passed the Act, Orange Street and other landowner
defendants posted no trespassing signs at public access points on the Weber
River and specifically forbade the public's use of the Weber's streambed for
any purpose. The State began issuing trespass citations to boaters and
anglers who waded in or walked upon the bed of the river without obtaining
landowner permission. This caused the Coalition's members to cease using
the Weber River for fishing and other lawful recreational purposes, and led
· the Coalition to bring this action to determine the Weber's navigability as the
only means available under the statute to re-establish its members' rights to
use the streambed.

It is clear that the Coalition has suffered a distinct and palpable injury
in that its members were no longer able to use the bed of the Weber River
while fishing and boating, and that this injury was caused by Orange Street's
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and the State's enforcement of trespass laws against the Coalition's members
pursuant to the Act. This injury was fully redressed by the district court's
navigability determination, and by the declaratory and injunctive relief it
awarded. Thus, the Coalition has standing under the traditional test.
By the same token, the Coalition has standing under the alternative
test. Under this test, which is designed for parties who fail to meet the
traditional test, a party can establish standing by showing that it has "the
interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing
all relevant legal and factual questions, and that the issues are unlikely to be
raised if the party is denied standing." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, if 36
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
By unearthing the history of navigational and commercial uses of the
Weber River during the statehood era, and presenting that evidence
effectively through expert witnesses at trial, the Coalition has shown not just
a necessary interest but a demonstrated ability to assist the court in
considering the legal and factual issues relevant to a navigability claim. In
addition, the Coalition was the only party willing and able to assert the
navigability of the Weber River. The State, specifically, was unwilling to
assert that claim. As shown supTa at 4-5, the State refused to include the
Weber on its list of adjudicated or claimed navigable waters. After passage of
the Act in 2010, the State began issuing citations to anglers and others for
24
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trespass on the bed of the river. Even after it became aware of the Coalition's
evidence of navigability, the State took "no formal position" regarding
navigability, but instead stated that the evidence "raises questions regarding
whether the Weber meets the applicable test." (R. 647, 676.) The State took
no firm position at trial on the two central legal issues in this appeal,
whether log drives can establish navigability and whether the seasonal
Cl)

nature of the log drives on the Weber River precludes a finding of
navigability. (R.647, 676, 858-65 5.) And in its Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, filed after the trial, the State again took no position on
the ultimate question of navigability. (R.911-30.) The claim of navigability
simply would not have been raised if the Coalition had been denied standing.

<ii

Thus, the Coalition meets the alternative test of standing.
Instead of focusing directly on the elements of the traditional or
alternative standing test, Orange Street relies on the Elder v. Nephi City ex

rel. Brough, for the proposition that a party who has no interest in property
cannot bring an action to quiet title. ·2007 UT 46,

,r 20, 164 P.3d 1238.

In ·

Elder, the wife of an auto-train accident victim argued that the railroad held
a prescriptive property right that allowed it to control the trees that obscured
her husband's view of the train tracks, and that it was negligent in failing to
@>

~

5

This part of the state's closing argument is missing from the transcript due
to a technical error, and is reflected in a summary of its argument filed by the
State after the trial.
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exercise that control. 2007 UT 46,

,r,r1, 2.

The court observed that it was

presented with the "perplexing question of whether and to what extent a
plaintiff may in the course of prosecuting a tort claim seek to impose upon an
unwilling defendant a property interest based on principles of prescription or
adverse possession." Id.

if 16. The court held that the victim's wife had no

standing to seek to establish such a property right. Id. if 20.
The fundamental distinction between this case and Elder is that the
Coalition's members do have an interest in the property that is the subject of
this action. That interest is the right, guaranteed by the Constitution and
laws of Utah, including the Public Waters Access Act, to use the beds of
navigable waterways for fishing and boating. That interest may not be a
direct ownership interest that would allow the Coalition to quiet title, but it
is not seeking to quiet title. It seeks only to vindicate its members' rights of
use.
This distinction is apparent in Holladay Towne Center, L.L. C. v. Brown

Family Holdings, L.L.C., where this court explained that the rule.stated in
Elder is limited to "plaintiffs with no interest" in the property. 2011 UT 9,

if 54, 248 P.3d 452.

The court went on to explain that Elder"limits standing

to those who could acquire an interest, not those who could acquire title." Id.
(quotations omitted). In Holladay Towne Center, the court held that a tenant
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has standing to quiet title to the landlord's property as against a third party
claiming an easement. Id. at if 55.
The distinction is also apparent in an earlier Utah case involving the
bed of a navigable waterbody. In Robinson v. Thomas, this court allowed two
parties with competing mining claims to litigate the State's ownership of
lands claimed to be within the bed of the Great Salt Lake. 286 P. 625 (1930).
®

The plaintiff claimed under a mineral lease from the State, the defendant
had filed a federal mining claim that would have been invalid on state
sovereign lands. 286 P. at 628. Forty-one years before the issue was settled

ti)

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971), the

Robinson court took judicial notice that the Great Salt Lake was navigable,
Ei

and it further determined that the lands in question lay within the bed of the
lake and were therefore owned by the State. Id. at 627. Noting that neither
party had sued to quiet title, but only for injunctive relief to prevent the other
party from interfering with possession, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
· based on the lake's navigability and the State's ownership of the bed. Id. at·
628.
Standing was not raised in Robinson. But as the court noted in

Holladay Towne Center, "[s]uch suits have in fact been allowed, but fly under
•

the radar because they are uncontroversial." 2011 UT 9,

,r 54. This has been

true of navigability claims brought by waterway users over the years.
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Indeed, the Coalition has found only two such cases in which the plaintiffs
standing was even questioned, and in both cases, the court found that the
plaintiff had standing.
In Montana Stream Access Coalition v. Curran, a case with
circumstances identical to this one, a coalition of river users sued landowners
who were obstructing its member's fishing and boating activities on the
Dearborn River in Montana. 682 P.2d 163,165 (Mont. 1984). The Montana
Supreme Court held that the state's presence as a party rendered the
question of the coalition's standing "immaterial." Curran, 682 P.2d at 171.
In Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208 (N.C.App. 2010), plaintiff
and defendant owned competing fish houses. Plaintiff sued defendant for
allegedly trespassing on an adjacent canal. Defendant raised navigability as
an affirmative defense. The trial court dismissed the case by finding that the
waters were navigable and that neither party had ownership rights in the
canal. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Defendant "has no standing to litigate
the rights of the State of North Carolina.'' 693 ·s.E.2d at 212. The court held
that although "no party has the standing to litigate the rights of the state,"
defendant did have standing to raise the navigability issue as an affirmative
defense, because "Defendant invokes the public trust doctrine, not to litigate
the rights of the state, but to ensure that Plaintiff does not prevent her from
enjoying those rights." Id. at 212-13.
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A good example of a user-filed navigability claim "flying under the
radar" is Northwest Steelheaders Association v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383
(Or.App. 2005), another case involving circumstances identical to the present
case. There, an association of anglers successfully brought a navigability
claim against landowners and the State of Oregon to vindicate fishing rights
on the John Day River. Simantel, 112 P.3d at 385. The decree in that case,
(I)

entered against the landowners and the state, declared that "title to all lands
lying below the ordinary high water mark of the John Day River is vested in
the Defendant State of Oregon." Judgment, Northwest Steelheaders

Association v. Simantel, No. 99C-12309 (Marion County Cir. Ct. Or. June 14,
2002), at p. 3 (attached as Add. B). This decree was affirmed by the Oregon
Gib

Court of Appeals without raising any question of the association's standing.
112 P.3d at 395. 6
Under the forgoing authorities, there is no question that the Coalition
has standing to bring a navigability claim on the Weber River to vindicate its
members' fishing· and boating rights~ The State's presence as a party, as was
the case in Curran and Simantel, eliminates any theoretical concerns that
issues affecting state title could be decided in the State's absence. Although
the State did not take a formal position on the ultimate question of

i)

8

Another case in which navigability for title was raised by a private party
and standing was not questioned is Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781 (8 th Cir.
1906).

6
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navigability, it was given every opportunity to do so, and it was fully involved
in the litigation of every factual and legal issue in the case that had the
potential to affect title. Orange Street attempted to take advantage of this by
requesting, in its Opening Statement and its Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, a determination that the Weber River is not navigable
where it flows through its property and, accordingly, that "title to the Weber
River did not transfer to the State of Utah," a determination that would have
bound both the Coalition and the State. (R.908, 974:28.) Having sought a
title determination at trial, Orange Street cannot now credibly claim that
that navigability and title were not fit for judicial resolution because Orange
Street did not get the result it wanted. It is also significant that in closing
argument Orange Street conceded that "it's within the rights of the plaintiff
to bring this lawsuit," arguing instead that the Coalition failed to carry its
burden of proof. (R.978:52.)
But the principal reason the Coalition has standing remains the fact
that it seeks only to vindicate its members' constitutionally and statutorily
recognized rights to use the bed of the Weber River for fishing and boating.
Its purpose is not to impose unwanted title on the State. State title may well
be an incident of navigability, but the Coalition did not request a judgment
quieting title in the State. If this court affirms the district court's ruling, the
State will be free to pursue (or not pursue) quiet title actions on the Weber
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River as it sees fit to resolve various title questions, such as the location of
the sovereign land boundary and how it is affected by accretion, erosion and
avulsion. The Coalition is not questioning the State's willingness and ability
to discharge these responsibilities; the only issue here is the proper
application of the navigability test.
Although the Coalition has been careful to go no further than necessary
Ci>

to establish its members' rights of use, this court should understand that
adopting Orange Street's position would leave the public with no legal
remedy whatsoever to protect its constitutionally guaranteed rights to use

i)

the State's navigable waterways. The State would be the sole arbiter of what
rivers are eligible for navigability determinations, and it would be able to
@

effectively shield its choices from judicial review. A boat carrying passengers
and cargo would have no recourse against a landowner obstructing passage
on a river yet to be adjudicated as navigable. A river user charged with
criminal trespass on such a river could not assert navigability as a defense.
Such outcomes would not be compatible with the Article XX and the public
trust doctrine. See Arizona Center For Law In The Public Interest v. Hassell,
837 P.2d 158 (Ariz.App. 1992) (legislation relinquishing navigability claims
invalid under state constitution and public trust doctrine). Such outcomes

~

demonstrate that Orange Street's standing arguments cannot be correct and
that the Coalition has standing to bring these claims.
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2.

The district court applied the correct navigability standard
In another argument made for the first time on appeal, Orange Street

contends that the district court applied the wrong standard of navigability
when it adjudicated the Coalition's claim. As noted above, Orange Street
argues that the Public Waters Access Act's definition of navigable waters
includes only waters that serve as present-day highways of commerce, and
that the Coalition's claim fails because its evidence related to statehood-era
uses. This argument misses the mark at several different levels.
The Coalition's claim is, and always has been, a federal navigability for
title claim. The applicable test, more fully addressed infra at 35-37, requires
evidence of commercial uses, or susceptibility of such uses, at statehood. The
district court correctly applied this century-old test to find that the Weber is
navigable which means that its bed is owned by the public and can be used by
the Coalition's members for fishing and boating.

It is important to understand that the Act is not the source of the
public's rights to use the bed of the Weber River. The source of those rights is
the federal law of navigability, as well as Art. XX of the Utah Constitution
and the public trust doctrine. See supra at 21-22. The Act merely confirms
the rights of the public to recreate on navigable streams, its purpose being to
exclude public recreational access to all other streams crossing private
property.
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If the Act were construed to preclude public recreational use of the beds

of navigable rivers, it would be blatantly unconstitutional. See supra at 31.
But the Act should not be so construed. Traditional navigable rivers are
included in the Act's navigable waters exemption. Utah Code §73-29201(1)(a)(i). While the definition of "navigable waters" in section 102(4) could
have been more artfully worded, it would make no sense interpret the
i>

Legislature's use of the present tense as limiting the definition to waters that
presently serve as highways of commerce, to the exclusion of waters that so
served at statehood and thus meet the traditional federal test. This would
run counter to the well-settled rule that waters navigable at statehood
remain navigable in present-day times even if they no longer serve as

Gt

highways of commerce. See infra at 36, 40 fn. 8. It would be far more
reasonable to conclude that the Legislature was using the present tense to
refer to waters that are considered navigable today because they meet the
traditional test, which happens to focus on conditions at statehood. Indeed, if
there is a difference between the Act's definition and the traditional
navigability test, it would be more reasonable to conclude that the Act has

expanded the realm of navigability to include not just traditional navigable
waters, but also waters that could meet a navigability test based upon
~

present-day conditions. A number of western states have done just that,
adopting what are commonly referred to as state navigability for use
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standards, so called because they do not affect title to the bed of the
waterbody. See e.g. Idaho Code §36-1601.
Interpreting the Act's navigable waters definition to include traditional
navigable waters avoids inconsistency with other statutes dealing with
navigable waters. For example, Title 65A of the Utah Code gives
management authority, including authority over recreation activities, to the
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands over all sovereign lands. Utah
Code §§65A-10-1, 2. The statute defines sovereign lands as lands beneath
"navigable bodies of water at the date of statehood." Id. §65A-1-1(4)
(emphasis added). It would make no sense to define navigable waters in the
Public Waters Access Act to exclude from recreational use the very waters the
Division was charged with managing for recreational use under Title 65A.
Certainly, nothing in the overall purpose of the Act, or in its extensive
preamble, suggests an intention to do that.
In the end, though, the interpretation of the Act's definition of
navigable waters may not really matter in this case. Even if navigable-fortitle waters are not included under that definition, the beds of those waters
are public and therefore they are "waters on public property" under the
second prong of the Act's exemption. Utah Code §73-29-201(1)(a)(ii). For this
reason, it was entirely appropriate for the district court to refer to the State's
sovereign land title in its Conclusions of Law (R.892) and its Final Judgment
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(R.938.) Even though this is not a quiet title action, the State's ownership of
the Weber's bed (in trust for the people), which is the unavoidable result of a
navigability determination, is what gives the public the right to fish and boat
on the river.
For all of these reasons, this court should rule that the district court
applied the correct navigability standard. Finally, considering how Orange
I>

Street is using its argument about the wrong navigability standard to
buttress its position that the Coalition lacks standing, the court should rule
that Orange Street's standing argument collapses along with its mistaken
arguments about navigability standards.

3.

The district court correctly concluded that the federal navigability test
can be satisfied by evidence of log drives regularly and successfully
conducted during seasonal periods of high water
The parties agree on the general formulation of the federal navigability

test applicable to this case. To the discussion at pp. 38-39 of Orange Street's
brief, the Coalition adds a few additional points. Although Utah gained
sovereign title to the beds of all waters in the state navigable at statehood,
there was no enumeration at that time of which waters were in fact
navigable. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012). The
task of determining navigability fell to the courts, both state and federal, but
the question is strictly one of federal law. Id.; see also Hardy v. State Land

Bd., 360 P.3d 647, 651 (Or.App. 2015). Thus, U.S. Supreme Court rulings on
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the subject are binding on this court. Rulings from lower federal courts and
other state courts, while they may be persuasive, are not necessarily binding.

Id.
The parties also agree that the foundation for the navigability test is
found in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in The Daniel Ball 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557 (1871):
Those rivers are public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in
fact. Rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce,
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water. Id. at 563.

The Daniel Ball was an admiralty case. Two additional elements were
added to the test to determine whether a water body is navigable for title
purposes. First, navigability is determined as of the time of statehood, when
title is deemed to have passed under the equal footing doctrine. PPL

Montana, 132 S.Ct. at 1228. 7 This means that a water navigable at statehood
will always remain so, regardless of post-statehood changes in conditions. Id.
Second, navigability for title is based on the "natural and ordinary condition"
of the water. Id. (quoting Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922). This

PPL Montana is the latest word from the U.S. Supreme Court on
navigability for title. Although the case involves issues not present here segmentation and proof of navigability by modern day recreational use - it
contains a helpful explanation of the general law of navigability. See 132
S.Ct. at 1226-1229. See also, Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional
Law: The Historical, Yet Declining Role of Navigability, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev.
1643 (2013).
7
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element eliminates waters that are made navigable only by artificial
improvements.
In sum, the Daniel Ball/navigability for title test boils down to five

•

elements: 1) use or susceptibility of use of a waterway; 2) at statehood; 3) in
its natural and ordinary condition; 4) as a highway of commerce over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted; and 5) in the customary mode of

tD

trade and travel over water. The district court properly applied these
elements to conclude that navigability was established for title purposes by
the statehood-era history of commercially useful log drives on the section of
the Weber River at issue in this case.

3.1.

Commercially useful log drives are sufficient to establish
navigability

Orange Street argues that log drives alone cannot satisfy the Daniel

Ball test because they don't involve trade and travel. Orange Street attempts
to create an artificial distinction between the word "trade" and the word
"travel," with trade referring to the transport of goods for sale, while travel
refers to human passenger travel by boat. Orange Street argues that both
elements must be present in all navigability cases. Because log drives do not
involve passenger travel by boat, Orange Street reasons that log drives alone
cannot establish navigability.
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This result-oriented theory would limit navigability to a very small
number of rivers where both passenger travel and commercial transportation
of goods were present at statehood. It has not been adopted by any court or
commentator. As will be shown below, it is contrary to the language and
rationale of the key U.S. Supreme Court cases on navigability, and it has
been specifically rejected by the holdings in several state and lower federal
court cases.
Orange Street's approach unreasonably limits the concept of travel to
the movement of human beings. While the word travel certainly
encompasses people moving about, it is equally true that goods travel from
place to place, and, more particularly, that logs travel downstream during a
log drive. Nothing in the Daniel Ball formulation suggests that the Court
intended to adopt Orange Street's ultra ·narrow definition limiting travel to
people only. The Court could easily have said "passenger travel by boat," but
it did not. Instead, it uses travel in a generic sense, following the term
"highway of commerce," ·reinforcing the notion that transportation on the
river, whether of goods, or people, or both, is sufficient. Indeed, as will be
shown below, the case law interpreting the Daniel Ball test consistently
emphasizes that no particular mode of transport is required. All that matters
is whether the river serves as a highway of useful commerce.
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3.1.1. U.S. Supreme Court authorities

In United States v. Utah(" Utah I'}, a leading navigability for title case
addressing portions of the Green, Colorado and San Juan Rivers, the Court
stated the fundamental principle that navigability "does not depend on the
mode by which commerce is ... conducted," but instead on whether "the
stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful
I)

commerce." 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931) (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
430, 441 (1874) and United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56
(1926)). Utah I drew upon The Montello, an early admiralty case in which
the Court observed that it would be "a narrow rule" to hold that "unless a
river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessel, it could not be
treated as a public highway." 87 U.S. at 441. The Court went on to say that
"capacity of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce
affords the true criterion of ... navigability" not "the extent and manner of
that use." Id. A river capable of being used for purposes of commerce is
navigable in fact "no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted."

Id.
Orange Street's argument that the transportation of goods must in all
cases be accompanied by evidence of passenger boat travel cannot be
reconciled with the language of Utah I and The Montello. The particular
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mode of transport simply does not matter. What matters is whether that
mode of transport was commercially useful.
In 1940, the Court specifically referred to log drives as a commercially
useful mode of transport in a navigability case when it said that it "is obvious
that the uses to which the streams may be put vary from the carriage of
ocean liners to the floating out of logs. United States v. Appalachian Elec.

Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405-06 (1940). The Court also stated that the
navigability tests must take into consideration that methods of using rivers
vary from one region of the country to another, observing that "the density of
traffic varies equally widely from the busy harbors of the seacoast to the
sparsely settled regions of the Western mountains." Id.
The importance of non-title cases like Appalachian Elec. Power and The

Gi

Montello cannot be discounted simply because they deal with navigability in
a regulatory or an admiralty context. 8 All federal navigability cases descend

In PPL Montana, the Court summarized the different applications of the
navigability rules as follows: "For state title under the equal-footing doctrine,
navigability is determined at the time of statehood, and based on the "natural
and ordinary condition" of the water. In contrast, admiralty jurisdiction
extends to water routes made navigable even if not formerly so, and federal
regulatory authority encompasses waters that only recently have become
navigable, were once navigable but are no longer, or are not navigable and
never have been but may become so by reasonable improvements. With
respect to the federal commerce power, the inquiry regarding navigation
historically focused on interstate commerce .... In contrast, for title purposes,
the inquiry depends only on navigation and not on interstate travel. This list
of differences is not exhaustive. Indeed, '[e]ach application of [the Daniel
8
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•

•

from a common ancestor-The Daniel Ball, itself an admiralty case, and they
share a common element-"highways for commerce over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water." Thus, when The Montello, Appalachian Elec. Power or other non-title
cases interpret that element, they are every bit as authoritative as any title
case. See Hardy, 360 P.3d at 660-61.
Read together, Utah I, The Montello and Appalachian Elec. Power
leave little doubt that log drives on Western rivers such as the Weber can be
used to establish navigability. There is no requirement of transport by
particular vessels, of passenger travel, or of transport for hire. This point is
reinforced by a 1971 case adjudicating the navigability of the Great Salt
<i>

Lake. There it was argued that ranchers using boats to haul their own
livestock to an island did not satisfy the navigability test because they were
not commercial carriers using the lake as a "highway in the customary sense
of the word" to carry "water-borne freight." Utah v. United States ("Utah 11'1,
403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971). The Court called that an "irrelevant detail" and stated
that the lake "was used as a highway and that is the gist of the federal test."

Id. Significantly, the type of boat travel approved in Utah II would not pass
muster under Orange Street's trade and travel theory because it involves

Ball] test ... is apt to uncover variations and refinements which require
further elaboration."' 132 S.Ct. at 1228-29 (citations omitted).
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travel but not trade. Neither would steamboats carrying passengers but not
cargo. This illustrates the flaw of Orange Street's attempt to treat "trade"
and "travel" as separate and distinct elements that must both be present in
all cases. There is nothing in the Court's jurisprudence that mandates such
an approach. Instead, the Court has always treated trade and travel simply
as words that help elucidate the essential element of transportation on a
highway of commerce.
3.1.2. State and lower federal court authorities

Orange Street's "trade and travel" argument has not fared well in state
and lower federal courts. The latest example is Hardy v. State Land Bd.,
dealing with the upper Rogue River in Oregon, and decided about six months
after the district court's ruling in this case. In Hardy, the lower court
granted summary judgment in favor of the landowners based on the same
arguments Orange Street makes here-that "as a matter of law, the state's
reliance on log drives is based on a misinterpretation of the federal test," and
that ~'there is nothing to indicate that people were travelling down the river

on the logs, and the federal test requires both trade and travel." 360 P .3d at
660. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that
evidence of log drives on the Rogue River can be used to establish its
navigability under the federal test, squarely rejecting Orange Street's "trade
and travel" argument. Id. at 661.
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Orange Street futilely attempts to distinguish Hardy on the basis that
the court also allowed consideration of modern day recreational boating use
as a means of proving susceptibility of use by similar craft at statehood.
Nothing in the court's opinion suggests that such evidence was a necessary
pre-requisite to the court's consideration of log drive evidence. Indeed, the
court's opinion first determines that log drive evidence is sufficient, before
turning to modern day recreational use. Orange Street's mistake is in
assuming that because both types of evidence are present, both are required.
Nothing in the opinion imposes such a requirement. Instead, the Oregon
court simply concludes that "the occurrence of log drives ... and evidence of
present-day boating use of that portion of the river, support the conclusion
@

that the river's conditions at the time of statehood would have permitted use
of the river as a highway of commerce-that is, for timber transport and
canoe-based travel and trade." Id. at 663. 9
Four other courts have based findings of navigability on evidence of log
drives alone. In State v. Bunkowski, Nevada brought an action againsfa

9

Sim an tel is another decision by the Oregon Court of Appeals approving the

use evidence of log drives to find navigability. Although the evidence in that
case was not limited to log drives, and included canoe use by Native
Americans, 19th Century sternwheelers and a ferry on specific stretches, the
court held that the use of rivers "to float timber from upstream logging
operations to downstream mills, a widespread practice in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, may be sufficient evidence of actual use to
establish navigability." 112 P.3d at 390.
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riparian landowner to determine ownership of the bed of the Carson River.
503 P.2d. 1231 (Nev. 1972). The Carson, similar in size to the Weber, rises in
the eastern Sierra Nevada Mountains and flows through the Carson Valley to
where it disappears into the Carson Sink. 503 P.2d at 1232; see Ex. 101. The
court noted that the Carson was "fortuitously and ideally located
geographically" for log drives and described them in terms that mirror the
drives on the Weber River. 503 P2d at 1232-33, 1236. Log drives were the
only form of commerce on the Carson; the opinion mentions no use by cargocarrying or passenger-carrying vessels, again mirroring the conditions on the
Weber. Id. The fact that Orange Street was able to find some mention of
minor evidence of boat use in the briefs in Bunkowskihardly helps its case.
That the Nevada court did not see fit to mention this evidence shows how
unimportant it was. Applying The Montello and Appalachian Elec. Power,
and relying only upon evidence of log drives, the court concluded that
"navigability for title has been established." Id at 1236.

· In Oregon Division of State Lands v~ Riverfront Protection Association,
a case adjudicating the navigability of the McKenzie River for title purposes,
the evidence consisted of log drives held in April, May and June over a period
of seventeen years. 672 F.2d 792, 795 (9 th Cir. 1982). Despite substantial
difficulties associated with the log drives - intractable log jams, too much
water, too little water, exposed gravel bars, boulders and shoals - thousands
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of logs were ultimately driven down the river, leading the court to conclude
that the "McKenzie was used in its ordinary condition as a highway for useful
commerce." Id. at 796. 10
The Montana Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Curran, an
action by a group of river users against a riparian owner to establish the
navigability of the Dearborn River, a river similar in size and character to the
Weber. See Ex. 101. The evidence of navigability consisted of log and
railroad tie drives during the three years leading up to statehood. 682 P .2d
at 166. The frequency, size and timing relative to statehood of the log drives
in Curran were indistinguishable from the evidence of log drives presented in
this case. Based on that evidence, the Montana Supreme Court held that
Gi)

"[cllearly, the Dearborn satisfied the log-floating test for navigability under
the federal test of navigability for title purposes." Id. The fact that the court
went on to hold that the same evidence was also sufficient to establish a right
of use under state law (similar although not the same as the right recognized
by this court in Conatser) does riot alter the court's dearly announced·
conclusion that the log drives satisfied the federal navigability f01" title test.

Orange Street criticizes the opinion in Riverfront and argues that the
Ninth Circuit "did not apply the appropriate test for navigability for title."
Appellant's Brief at 46. This same argument was rejected by the Oregon
Court of Appeals in Hardy, which found that Riverfront's use of regulatory
navigability authorities appropriate and persuasive. 360 P.3d at 660-61; see
discussion supra at 40-41.
10
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A fourth case, although not a title case, provides strong additional
support for the conclusion that log drives alone are sufficient to establish
navigability. Loving v. Alexander involved a determination by the Army
Corps of Engineers that a twenty mile segment of the Jackson River in
Virginia was navigable for the purpose of establishing public access and
recreational use in connection with the construction of a federal dam project.
745 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1984). The only evidence of navigation on the river
consisted of log and railroad tie drives during the late 1800s and early 1900s.

Id. at 867. The Fourth Circuit, applying the Daniel Ball test, concluded that
"commercial use was made of the log-floating capacity of the river" and that
the "drives demonstrated that the stream was indeed useful as a means of
commercial transportation." Id.
In sum, there is no validity to Orange Street's theory that passenger
travel is required to establish navigability. The district court correctly
concluded that commercially useful log drives are sufficient.

3.2.

The seasonal nature of the Weber log drives does not preclude a
finding of navigability

In considering Orange Street's argument that the seasonal nature of
the Weber log drives precludes navigability, this court should keep in mind

Appalachian Elec. Power's statement that the "character of the region"
determines the regularity and extent of use needed to establish navigability.
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311 U.S. at 410. As shown supra at 6-9, like many other rivers in the Rocky
Mountains and the Intermountain West, the Weber generates most of its
flows from melting snowpack in the Uinta Mountains during a two to three
month period in the spring. The log drives on the Weber and elsewhere in
the region took advantage of these conditions. In other parts of the country,
high water is caused by rainstorms and it occurs irregularly and
unpredictably. See e.g., Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 587 (Red River in Texas).
But loggers in this region knew that they could depend on the high water
that comes every spring with the melting of the snowpack. During the winter
months, they prepared by cutting and stacking railroad ties, cordwood and
mining timbers along the river banks. When the snowpack released its
®

waters in the spring, the loggers released their products into the rivers. This
practice was used all over the West to transport enormous quantities of
timber products from forest to market.
Far from being a disqualifying factor, the seasonal flows on the Weber
and other rivers in the region were what made the drives possible.
(R.974:120, 229.) As Dr. Dant testified, the industry used seasonal log drives
because "they made good economic sense." (R.974=223.) According to the
district court, the spring drives on the Upper Weber represented "useful
commerce" and they "played a significant role in developing the railroad and
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mining industries" and provided wage paying employment for the citizenry
and "added significant value to local economies." (R.891.)
Under these facts, Orange Street cannot succeed with its argument
that a river is not navigable if it was useful "only in times of temporary high
water." United States v. Rio Grande Dam Irrigation Co.,114 U.S. 690, 699
(1899). Cases after Rio Grande Dam clarified that the key factor is whether
the seasonal use represents a commercial reality. See Economy Light &

Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 122 (1921) (navigation need not be
"open at all seasons of the year, or at all stages of the water"); Appalachian

Elec. Power, 311 U.S. at 300 (no requirement of continuous use; the
"character of the region, its products influence the regularity and extent of
the use"); PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. at 1234 (navigation need not be
susceptible "at every point during the year," as long as susceptibility is not
"so brief that it is not a commercial reality

11
).

Several state and lower federal court cases have found that when log
drives are a commercial reality, as they were on the Weber River, the
seasonal nature of the practice is no bar to a finding of navigability. For
example, in Riverfront, the evidence consisted of log drives held in April, May
and June over a seventeen year period. 672 F.2d at 795. The Ninth Circuit
held that Rio Grande Dam was inapplicable and that the "seasonal nature of
log drives on the McKenzie [does not] destroy its navigable character." Id.
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Rather, because thousands of logs were ultimately driven down the river, the
court concluded that the "McKenzie was used in its ordinary condition as a
highway for useful commerce." Id. at 796.
In Loving, the Fourth Circuit noted that the log and railroad tie drives
on the Jackson River "were not exceptional one-time occurrences of the sort
rejected as a basis of navigability in Rio Grande Dam," but instead
represented "regular, not occasional, drives whenever the water level rose 18
inches or more, which happened in a somewhat predictable fashion several
times each year." 745 F.2d at 867. This led the court to conclude that the
river was "indeed useful as a means of commercial transportation" under the

Daniel Ball test. Id. In Hardy and Simantel, the Oregon Court of Appeals
@

similarly found Rio Grande Dam inapplicable to log drives on the Rogue and
John Day Rivers. 360 P.3d at 660; 112 P.3d at 391. 11
The results in these log drive cases are consistent with this court's
discussion of navigability principles in Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759 (1946),
involving Scipio Lake. There, the court started with the observation that
that navigability does not depend "merely upon the physical capabilities of
the particular body of water" but upon whether it is "so situated that it

11

Although the courts in Bunkowski and Curran did not discuss the seasonal
nature of the log drives, the flow conditions on the Carson and Dearborn
Rivers are very similar to the Weber's. See Ex. 101. Orange Street's
argument is flatly inconsistent with the results in those cases.
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becomes or is likely to become a valuable factor in commerce." 175 P .2d at
762. Using a formulation that the U.S. Supreme Court would repeat over 60
years later in PPL Montana, the court went on to say that the "navigable
quality" of a water body need not be "continuous," but it must continue "long
enough to be useful and valuable in transportation." Id. at 761 (quoting

Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. at 783 .. And finally, regarding seasonal uses, the
court stated that "the fluctuations should come regularly with the seasons, so
that the period of navigability may be depended upon." Id.
The cases Orange Street relies upon to make its seasonality argument
simply do not apply here. For example, the Red River at issue in Oklahoma

v. Texas could not be more different from the Weber. It arises in the Texas
panhandle, "where the rainfall is light" and "confined to a relatively short
period in each.year" and the river "does not have a continuous or dependable
volume of water." 258 U.S. at 587. In contrast to the predictable, dependable
spring flows on the Weber, the water rises on the Red only for "short
intervals, when the rainfall is running off," lasting from "1 to 7 days." Id. It
is hard to imagine how any commercial enterprise depending on high water
could be established under such circumstances. Not surprisingly, the Court
found that a "greater capacity for practical and beneficial use in commerce is
essential to establish navigability." Id. at 592.
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North Dakota v. United States involved the Little Missouri, a river that
rises in the plains of northeastern Wyoming, and flows through the badlands
of North Dakota. 972 F.2d 235 (8 th Cir 1992). The evidence consisted of a
single attempted but commercially unsuccessful tie drive in the 1880s. 972
F.2d at 238. The district court found that the logger "had so much trouble
transporting the ties on the River ... that he had to resort to hauling ties
overland." Id. The district court further found that the few ties that made it
down the river did so with the help of water "higher ... than it has ever been
known before." Id. at 239. The district court concluded "the failed efforts to
conduct a tie drive supported the contention ... that the Little Missouri was
not a highway of useful commerce at the time of statehood" and that the tie
i>

drive was "a unique and isolated venture." Id. Not surprisingly, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed. Id.
Finally, in Rio Grande Dam, the Court looked at affidavits that
asserted only "[t]he mere fact that logs, poles and rafts are floated down a
stream occasionally and in tirries of high water." 174 U.S. at 698. The case

~

gives no indication of the regularity, seasonality or commercial utility of the
log floats in question. For all we know, the floats were non·commercial
ventures carried out during unseasonable flood events, a reasonable

i>

interpretation given the Court's further statement that "[i]ts use for any
purposes of transportation has been and is exceptional ... [t]he ordinary flow
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of water is insufficient." Id. at 699 (emphasis added). Thus, Rio Grande Dam
cannot be read as announcing a general rule of law regarding log drives or
other seasonal uses. At most it represents a failure of proof under the
particular circumstances, which is how courts in later cases have read the
decision. E.g.; Riverfront, 672 F.2d at 795; Hardy, 360 P.3d at 660; Loving,
745 F.2d at 867; Simantel, 112 P.3d at 391.
To conclude, none of Orange Street's cases involve commercially useful
log drives. At most, they stand for the proposition that a commercially
unsuccessful log drive, like any other commercially unsuccessful use of a
river, does not establish navigability. Based upon all the authorities, the
district court in the present case correctly concluded that "the fact that,
during certain seasons of a year, a waterway may not be useful for commerce
or trade should not bar a finding of navigability." (R.871.) The district court
observed that some navigable waterways may not be passable due to ice or
freezing during winter seasons, some may not be useful for commerce during
high runoff, while others may not be useful for commerce during low runoff. ·
(Id.) But "evidence of seasonality of commerce on a waterway should not bar

a finding of navigability, provided that the waterway was regularly used for
commerce on a seasonal basis, and was not dependent on unusual conditions
for use in commerce." (Id.) The district court then resolved the key fact
question, finding that that loggers could and did dependably rely on the
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Weber's spring flows, and that the resulting log drives did in fact represent
useful commerce. (R.891.) Orange Street does not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting these findings. Accordingly, the district court's
ruling is correct and there is no basis to overturn it.

G.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly addressed sovereign title to the bed of the
Weber River where it passes through the Properties because sovereign title is
an essential attribute of navigability and the Coalition has standing to bring
a navigability claim. The district court also applied the correct test of
navigability, and in doing so, properly determined that the Weber River is
navigable where it passes through the Properties. This court should affirm.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2016.
FABIAN VANCOTT
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Mari~~ 4 2001

#25

3

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

4

FOR THE COUNTY OF MARION

114,,a·

''cui/rt_
~lift

5
6
7
8

NORTHWEST STEELHEADERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Oregon
nonprofit corporation and Petitioner;
RAYMOND D. DEZELLEM; and
RICHARD "RICK" ALLEN,

Case No. 99C-12309
Plaintiffs,

9

10

11
12
13

v.
DAVID SIMANTEL AND TAMMY
SIMANTEL, husband and wife; STATE
OF OREGON, by and through the Oregon
State Land Board; DAVID K. SCHLECHT
AND SARAH J. SCHLECHT, and
MIANI, WILLIAMSON & EVANS,

14

JUDGMENT

Defendants,

15
and
· 16
ROBERT JON GROVER,

17

Defendant/
Intervenor.

18

19

THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial on February 11, 2002 before the Honorable

20

Paul Lipscomb on claims by plaintiffNorthwest Stee]headers Association, Inc. against defendant

21

State of Oregon, and before a jury sitting in· an advisory capacity on the factual issues raised by

22

plaintiffs Dezel1em and Allen's claims pertaining to the navigability of certain portions of the

23

John Day River. Plaintiffs appeared by and through their counsel, Thane W. Tienson; defendant

24

State of Oregon appeared by and through its counsel, WiHiam Cloran; defendants Simanie],

25

Schlecht, and Miani, Williamson & Evans appeared by and through their counsel, Gordon

26

Hanna; and defendant/intervenor Grover appeared by and through his counsel, David Bartz.
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,,
Counsel made opening statements, introduced testimony and other evidence with regard
2

to their respective claims and defenses, and the parties rested.

3

Arguments were then made to the jury in behalf of the respective parties and the advisory

4

jury, having been instructed on all matters of law 3!1d having retired to deliberate on its verdict

5

on February 21, 2002, returned into Court an advisory verdict in favor of plaintiffs Dezellem and

6

Allen on February 22, 2002, which, omitting the title of the Court and cause and questions

7

pertaining· to the counterclaims asserted by the defendants, was in the following fonn:

8

"WE, THE JURY, being duly empaneled, return our verdict as follows:

9

"1.

10

11

Is the John Day River navigable in fact at the property owned by Miani,
Williamson and Evans?

"_X_

no

yes

12

Is the John Day River navigable in fact at the property owned by David
and Tammy Simantel and David and Sarah Schlect?

13

"_X_

"5.

**

14
15

nd

"Dated this 22

*.

day of February, 2002.
"S. Susayne Fisher
"Jury Foreperson"

16

17
18

Thereafter, the Court, having considered the advisory verdict and the issues having being

19

duly tried, issued an Opinion and Order dated March 13, 2002 (a copy of which is attached

20

hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference), and the Court further finds:

21
22

Mary Anderson and Steven Anderson own property abutting the John. Day River as
follows:

23

"Township 2N, Range 19E, Section 29, Tax Lot Unknown, Gilliam County."

24

Mary Anderson and Steven Anderson were former defendants in this action and were

25

parties to a Stipulated Judgment of Dismissal With Prejudice and Without Costs entered pursuant

26

to ORCP 57B filed on July 31, 2001, and entered on August 2, 2001. Pursuant to that Stipulated
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1

Judgment of Dismissal, Mary Anderson and Steven Anderson agreed not to contest plaintiffs'

2

claims regarding the navigability of the John Day River, in this case or otherwise, as it applied to

3

the real property owned by them, provided that plaintiffs would not pursue any claims for

4

attorney fees or other costs and disbursements against Mary Anderson and Steven Anderson and .

5

would dismiss their claims against Mary Anderson and Steven Anderson with prejudice and

6

without costs, disbursements and/or attorney fees of any kind.

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby makes and enters the following:

7

JUDGMENT

8
9

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff Dezellem

IO

have, take, and recover a judgment against defendants David and Tammy Simantel on their

11

counterclaim against him for his costs and disbursements incurred herein tweed in the sum of

12

$ c . S W ~ d that plaintiff Allen have, talce, and recover a judgment against

13

defendant Miani, Williamson & Evans on its counterclaim /l>_ainst him for his costs and

14

disbursements incurred herein taxed in the sum of$

l

<on ~

<.,

15

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that title to all lands lying below the

16

ordinary high water mark of th~ John Day River is vested in the defendant State of Oregon, in

17

Trust for the Citizens of the State of Oregon, as the River passes the following described real

18

property:

19

"Township 1N, Range 19E, Section 3, Tax Lot 500, Gilliam County (Simantel);

20

"Township 2N,
(Simantel);

21

Section 33,

Tax

Lot 1904,

Gilliam

County

"Township lN, Range l 9E, Sections 3, 2 and 11, Tax Lots 100-200, and
Section 14, Tax Lot 2500, Shennan County (Schlect);

22

"Township 2N, Range l 9E, Sections 29, Tax Lot Unknown, Gilliam County
(Anderson); and

23

24

"Township 9S, Range 20E, Tax Lot 4400, Wheeler County (Miani, Williamson &
Evans)."

25
26

Range 19E,

Ill/II
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') 1ff

.t

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND" ADJUDGED that plaintiff Northwest Steelheaders
2

Association, Inc. have, take, and recover a judgment against defendant State of Oregon for its

3

costs and disbursements in~d herein truced in the amount of$

4

DATED this

/j aay of June, 2002.

8-2 ;;).., t9o

•

5

6
7

8
9

10

Submitted by:
Thane W. Tienson, OSB #77374
LAND YE BENNETT BLUMSTEIN LLP
OfAttorneys for Plaintiffs

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22

•

23
24
25

26
Page 4 - JUDGMENT
P:1Clfuuslstulheaders\TW1'plwding1\jruJgm1 order.dDC
LANDYE BBNNErl' BLUMSTEIN LLP
.l'Ul:llnlf1lolUi1
1300 S.W. Pifm A•cru=, Suia: 3500
l'ordand, 0Rpl 91201
503.2:zUIOO

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

111r

